Abstract: We develop a spatial model of two-party competition in which parties are better informed than voters about the bliss point of voters. The announced positions of the parties serve as signals to the voters concerning the parties' private information. Surprisingly, in all separating equilibria, when the left-wing party attains power, the policies it implements are to the right of the policies implemented by the right-wing party when it attains power. The intuition behind this result is that when right-wing policies become more attractive, the left party m o ves toward the right in order to be assured of winning, while the right-wing party stays put in a radical stance.
Introduction
Elections aggregate information dispersed among the public by allowing voters to express their opinions about the policy positions adopted by the parties. However, the information available to the public might miss key facts in economic or foreign policy issues that are available only to policymakers. Indeed, while policymakers deal frequently with policy issues, for most other people it is irrational to become politically well-informed Downs 1957 . In such a case, the welfare of society may increase if the policymakers convey their private information to voters before the election. Policy proposals, therefore, have two di erent roles. One is to announce the parties' positions to the public so that voters can express their opinions and preferences. The other is to send signals to voters regarding the parties' private information. The rst role has long been recognized in the literature inspired by Condorcet's 1785 Jury Theorem. 1 The second role, on the other hand, has received much less attention. 2 It is this aspect of electoral competition we investigate in the present paper.
If political parties are privately informed, there is no guarantee that they will reveal their information to the public. Strategic manipulation may arise when the preferences of parties and voters di er. In the model we propose, two parties with polarized preferences a right-wing party and a left-wing party obtain information unobservable by the public and compete for o ce, thus creating the possibility of such manipulation. It turns out that this model generates results that are consistent with the observed phenomena of 1 policy reversals," i.e., situations in which the right-wing party implements left-leaning policies, and vice versa.
The Nixon and Clinton administrations have been considered by the media to beexamples of policy reversals. For example, The Economist claims that Clinton governs like a Republican just as Nixon governed like a Democrat." 3 Indeed, there are a number of episodes in which important policy shifts have been supported by the electorates on parties or candidates whose traditional positions were to oppose such policies. Cases in point are marketoriented reforms in Latin America. Throughout the region, radical trade liberalization and scal adjustment have been implemented by the parties or candidates which had proved in the past a penchant for populism and interventionism, such as Menem in Argentina, Fujimori in Peru, and Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia. 4 While we do not commit to a particular interpretation of historic events, we o er a model in which leftists win when the underlying shock suggests right wing policies, and vice versa.
Our model focuses on electoral competition between two equally informed parties. The political parties have better information than the voting public about the likely outcome of di erent policies. Political parties are represented as having distinct and polarized preferences on outcomes, and hence on policies. 5 The utility o f v oters depends on the outcome of the policy adopted by 3 A Democratic Nixon?" November 2, 1996 . The same parallel between Nixon and Clinton is drawn in a recent article in Newsweek, N o vember 16, 1998 . 4 We do not claim that every large policy shift has been conducted by political parties having a record of opposing it. Clear counterexamples are the New Deal implemented under F. D. Roosevelt and the increase in the military spending under Reagan. But the episodes mentioned above raise the question of under which circumstances voters would end up supporting a political party to implement a set of policies that appear to be far from the party's ideal policies rather than a political party whose ideology favors such policies. 5 The above assumption on parties' preferences is not very realistic in two respects. First, it is extreme to assume that their preferences are polarized. However, the qualitative the winning party. The voters know exactly their preferences over outcomes, but they do not know with certainty how policies relate to outcomes. The parties simultaneously announce and commit to their policy platforms, after obtaining some information about the correspondence between policies and outcomes. The voters do not have the information that the parties obtained. Instead, they observe the announced platforms and then decide which party to vote for. The policy announced by the winning party is implemented.
We distinguish two types of equilibria, pooling equilibria and separating equilibria. In pooling equilibria, voters are unable to infer the information held by the parties since neither party conditions its policy announcements on the received information. In separating equilibria, the voters are able to infer the information held by the parties from their policy announcements, and use this information in order to decide which party to support.
In all equilibria, the platform of the right-wing party is located to the right of that of the left-wing party i n e v ery single election. That is, in every election, policy platforms are ordered as we w ould expect from the ideological positions of the parties. Separating equilibria, however, exhibit a paradoxical feature: the right-wing party implements policies that are to the left of the policies implemented by the left-wing party. Di erent parties win in di erent states of the world.
In separating equilibria the information shared by the parties serves as a correlation device for the parties' policy platforms. There are two types of separating equilibria, according to whether policy platforms are positively result would not change as long as the bliss points of the parties and the median voter are aligned in the same order in every state of the world, i.e., the bliss point of the left-wing resp. right-wing party is to the left resp. right of that of the median voter. Second, as discussed in Section 5, our results hold if parties care both about policies and about winning the election, as long as the policy motivation is strong compared to the desire to hold o ce. correlated or negatively correlated with the state of the world" i.e. the median voter's preferred policy platform if voters learn the information held by the parties. We focus the analysis on positive correlation equilibria. In all positive correlation equilibria, the median voter supports the left-wing party when the revealed information favors the adoption of right-leaning policies, and vice versa. This result, together with some additional observations, gives rise to the paradox of policy reversals.
Roughly speaking, the above result is supported as an equilibrium outcome by the following location choices of the parties and belief formation of the voters. Suppose that the signal favors the adoption of right-leaning policy the other case is similarly taken care of. In this case, the policy position of the left-wing party is to the left of the median voter's bliss point, while the position of the right-wing party is to the right, and they are equally distant from the bliss point. If the right-wing party m o ves toward the median voter's bliss point, then the voters' beliefs are changed so that they put a positive probability on the other signal and still favor the position of the left-wing party. The movement in the opposite direction does not change the outcome. The left-wing party also has no incentive to move. If it moves to the left, then it loses the election, and the opponent implements the policy. It has no incentive to move to the right since it wins the election anyway.
The logic behind the nonexistence of other separating equilibria with positive correlation is complicated as there are many candidates for equilibria which should be eliminated. In this introduction, we provide intuition for why the moderate wins for certain, i.e., the left-wing party wins with probability one when the signal favors the adoption of right-leaning policies, and the right-wing party wins in the opposite case.
Suppose, in an equilibrium with positive correlation, that the right-wing party wins with a positive probability when the signal favors the right-leaning policies. We divide the argument i n to two cases. First, if this party's policy position is located to the right of the median voter's bliss point, then the left-wing party has an incentive to move towards the right just enough to win the election for certain. In doing so, it does not have to worry about an unfavorable shift of voters' beliefs since they already have the worst beliefs for the party.
Second, if the right-wing party is located either at the median voter's bliss point or to its left, then it wins the election for certain. In this case, the leftwing party has an incentive to mislead the public by switching its platform to the one that it would take when the realized signal favors the left-leaning policies. Thus, in an equilibrium with positive correlation it cannot bethe case that the right-wing party wins with a positive probability if its favorite state is realized.
For the sake of completeness, we also analyze separating equilibria with negative correlation between platforms and the state of the world. These equilibria are even more paradoxical: both the left-wing party and the rightwing party change their platforms further to the left if the state of the world favors the adoption of right-leaning policies, a possibility for which we strongly doubt there is a real life counterpart. Indeed, we show that among separating equilibria only those with positive correlation survive a requirement similar in avor to renegotiation-proofness, which w e call credibility. Credibility requires that no party announces a platform which i t w ould like to renege on after the election is over and the median voter, a fortiori, a majority, w ould be willing to go along with such a deviation from announced policy platforms.
We h a ve clear-cut welfare implications when we measure welfare in terms of the expected payo of the median voter. First of all, every separating equilibrium with positive correlation leads to a higher expected payo for the median voter than any pooling equilibrium, which in turn leads to a higher expected payo than any separating equilibrium with negative correlation. Moreover, among separating equilibria with positive correlation, the farther the two implemented platforms are apart, the higher is the expected payo for the median voter. To the extent that they are best for voters, we can consider separating equilibria to befocal. On the other hand, if we restrict voters' beliefs to be resistant to unilateral deviations in separating equilibria, as proposed by Bagwell and Ramey 1991 , pooling equilibria are selected. We remain agnostic on re nements, and consider both pooling and separating equilibria as plausible predictions.
It is useful to compare our work with the work of Cukierman and Tommasi, who rst built a model to explain policy reversals. Cukierman and Tommasi 1998a explain policy reversals in a context in which the incumbent government, but not the challenger, has better information than voters about the relation between policies and outcomes. In a related paper, Cukierman and Tommasi 1998b explain policy reversals in the context that the party in power must submit a policy proposal to a referendum. In both cases, the driving force of their result is that voters are willing to accept right-leaning policies only when they are proposed by a left-wing incumbent: if even the left-wing party f a vors the rightward shift, we m ust favor it too." For this argument t o w ork, it must be the case that the policy reversal is observed only when there is an extreme shock so that even the incumbent prefers to move 6 in the direction it normally dislikes. Cukierman and Tommasi note that the credibility of a policy that is, how appropriate people think is a policy given their beliefs about the state of the world depends on the ideological identity of the policy maker proposing it, as well as on the policy he proposes. The setup of our model is di erent from theirs in that we h a ve t wo informed parties competing for the electorate. Both parties commit to policy platforms before the election, while in Cukierman and Tommasi 1998a only the informed party the incumbent has to commit and the competition between parties play no role. In our model, policy reversals are observed even when the most preferred policy of the left-wing party is unambiguously tilted to the left. Reversals occur not because everyone likes it, but because one of the two parties reluctantly moves toward the policies it dislikes in order to win the election. Cukierman and Tommasi's account of policy reversals seems more appropriate to explain the case of a winning candidate who chooses a surprising policy, while our account is perhaps more appropriate when parties move their positions before an election in the direction most preferred by the eventual loser.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds a model with the features described above. Section 3 characterizes and discusses pooling equilibria. Section 4 does a similar analysis for separating equilibria. Section 5 presents some extensions. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Model
Consider a society with two parties, denoted by L and R; and a numberof voters. They play an election game. In the beginning, nature chooses one of two possible states, ,1 and 1. We assume that both states occur with the same probability. After observing the state, the two parties simultaneously propose a platform, given by a real number. In the next stage, voters vote for one of the two parties. Before they vote, they observe the platforms of the parties but not the state of nature. The party which obtains the majority o f the votes wins the election and carries out the proposed platform.
If the state is s = ,1; 1, and if the implemented policy is located at x; then the outcome y is assumed to be given by y = x , s:
Thus, the policy position x = s always induces the outcome y = 0 .
We assume that all voters have symmetric, single-peaked preferences on the outcome space. That is, for every voter there is an ideal outcome, and the utility of the voter is strictly decreasing in the distance from his or her ideal and the actual outcome. Since the outcome space is one-dimensional and voters have single-peaked preferences, all that matters for the analysis is the vote of the median voter. 6 We assume that the ideal outcome for the median voter is 0. Thus, if the proposed platform of the winning party is x 2 ; and if the state is s s = ,1; 1; then the median voter's payo function vx; s is single-peaked and symmetric around s. Voters are expected payo maximizers.
Parties L and R have lexicographic preferences. They rst care about the outcome of the actual implemented policy irrespective of which party is elected. If the payo s from the chosen policies are identical, each party prefers winning the election to losing it. The rst-order payo functions for Party L and Party R are u L x; s and u R x; s, respectively. For the sake of simplicity, we keep symmetry by assuming u L , ; s = u R ; s for all . We assume further that u L x; s is strictly concave and strictly decreasing in x, a fortiori, u R x; s is strictly concave and strictly increasing in x. That is, Party L always prefers outcomes to the left and Party R always prefers outcomes to the right. 7 Moreover, both parties are risk-averse. 8 We consider Bayesian Nash equilibria of this election game, with trembling hand perfection for the second stage. These trembles correspond to some arbitrarily small uncertainty about how voters would vote, which turns out to preclude complete convergence of policy platforms in equilibrium. 9 We focus on the equilibria in which the parties use pure strategies but the median voter does not necessarily do so. 10 The above restrictions reduce our description of an equilibrium, or in general, a pair of a strategy pro le and a belief system, to a tuple of the form x , 7 Our results will not change if we assume that Party L and Party R have bliss points to the left and to the right of the median voter's, but we prefer to save on notation and length of the proofs. 8 With polarized risk-neutral parties, information transmission from parties to voters e ectively requires voters to have some information of their own; see e.g. the arbitration model of Gibbons 1988 and related models, such as Martinelli 1999 . 9 We use trembles only for the voting strategies. Note that trembling hand perfection de ned by Selten 1975 cannot be applied to this game directly since there are a continuum of strategies for the parties. 
In this de nition, E P x L ; x R is the expected payo of the median voter if Party P = L; R wins and implements x P . We will say that an equilibrium is pooling if each party proposes the same platform irrespective of states, i.e., both x , L = x + L and x , R = x + R hold. Conversely, we will say that an equilibrium is separating if either x , L 6 = x + L or x , R 6 = x + R or both holds. On the equilibrium path, there is no updating of beliefs if the equilibrium is pooling, and there is a complete transmission of information from parties to voters if the equilibrium is separating. Note that no restriction is imposed on voters' beliefs other than they are correct on the equilibrium path.
Before we go to each class of equilibria, it is worthwhile to mention the following lemma. It states that for each signal i.e., in every election the platform proposed by the left-wing party is to the left of the one proposed by the right-wing party. No policy reversal is observed in any single election. R ; then the party which wins with a positive probability has an incentive to deviate. Suppose that Party L wins with a positive probability. Then by setting its policy at x , R ; it obtains x , R for sure, which is better than a combination of x , R and
R ; ,1 for any q k ; 2 0; 1 and any x 0 L x , : Therefore, the rst equilibrium condition perfection is violated, i.e., one cannot nd a sequence q k for which incentive constraints are satis ed. Other cases are proven in the same manner.
departures from full convergence when parties are policy-oriented has been well understood since the work of Wittman 1983 and Calvert 1985 . Our lemma extends their results to a situation in which v oters' beliefs about the correspondence between policies and outcomes are in uenced by the policies proposed by the parties.
Pooling equilibria
In these equilibria, Parties L and R make di erent proposals from each other, say, x L and x R , respectively, but each of them sticks to the same platform regardless of the state. Hence, no information is revealed to voters on the equilibrium path. The idea of the proof is that parties stick to a given platform because voters interpret any deviation as evidence against the deviating party. Thus, no information is transmitted from parties to voters. The existence of uninformative equilibria is standard in the context of signaling games, and it does not depend on the particular features of the model we propose, other than the fact that we do not impose any restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
We claim the following: Proposition 1. x L ; x L ; x R ; x R ; ; q is a pooling equilibrium for some A t ypical pooling equilibrium outcome in terms of policy positions is described in Figure 1 . Note that in all pooling equilibria the left-wing party's platform is to the left of the median voter's ideal point, given that no information is revealed to voters, while the right-wing party's platform is to the right. 1=2 otherwise.
Values of q; for out-of-equilibrium platforms are easily obtained from the assumed beliefs. In case i, whenever Party L deviates, the outcome will be either x R or something that is to the right of x R : Thus, Party L has no incentive to deviate. Party R has no incentive to deviate, either. Indeed, if the party deviates, voters believe that the state is ,1; and in order to beat Party L;
Party R has to move to the left if it is to win with positive probability in the equilibrium, in which case it is worse o . The proof of perfection is relegated to Appendix 1.
Case ii is the mirror image of case i. In case iii, an alternative for Party L is to set its platform just to the right of 1 , to obtain the median voter's support with probability one. The condition stated in iii implies that this deviation does not give the party a higher payo The set of separating equilibria can be divided into two subclasses, depending on whether the implemented policy and the state of nature are positively or negatively correlated. We consider the two subclasses in that order. For reasons that will become apparent later on, our main focus is on equilibria with positive correlation.
Separating equilibria with positive correlation
In these equilibria, Party L wins the election with probability one if s = 1; i.e., if the state of the world favors the adoption of right-leaning policies, and Party R wins if s = ,1. In other words, the wrong" party wins every election. Voters, however, bene t from the fact that the policy platforms of both parties are positively correlated with the state of the world. The discussion in Section 5 shows that these equilibria are the best in terms of the median voter's welfare.
It might b e useful to provide some intuition about why separating equilibria with positive correlation necessarily exhibit such policy reversals. In positive correlation equilibria, the party that most dislikes the policies implied by the state of the world is forced to play as a moderate because of the knowledge that the other party will play as a radical, and vice versa, the party that plays as a radical will do so because of the knowledge that its opponent will be a moderate. That is, both parties' policy positions move i n the same direction, left or right, because the state of the world serves as a correlation device for their strategies.
As is usually the case in models of electoral competition, we can imagine that the attempt to win the election thus, ensuring the adoption of more desirable policies than those espoused by their opponents will push both parties in a separating equilibrium to converge toward the optimal policy for the median voter that is, the state of the world. In our model, however, there is a countervailing force: voters use policy positions to make inferences about the state of the world. Thus, if Party L moves towards the right this is interpreted as evidence of the state of the world being 1, and if Party R moves toward the left this is interpreted as evidence on the contrary. For the party playing as a radical, moving towards the true state of the world risks convincing voters that the opposite state of the world is more likely. However, for the party playing as a moderate, voter's beliefs are already the worst possible ones: that is why it is behaving as a moderate in the rst place. Hence, it is less costly" for the moderate to converge to the optimal policy for the swing voter. In equilibrium, the moderate party will move its policy position close enough to the state of the world to win the election, knowing that at some point the radical party will give up on getting closer: before convincing voters that the state of the world is more likely to beon the opposite side of the political spectrum. 
Separating equilibria with negative correlation
These equilibria are even more paradoxical than those with positive correlation. In these equilibria, the right-wing party wins the election when the state of the world favors right-leaning policies, and the left-wing party when the state of the world favors left-leaning policies. However, both parties shift their policy platforms to the left if the state of the world favors the adoption of right-leaning policies. Hence, the correct" party wins the election, but it does so with the wrong" policy platform. As a result, the median voter may end up being worse o than in an equilibrium in which no information held by the parties is revealed see Section 5. The discussion in Section 5 shows that these equilibria do not satisfy a requirement related to the credibility o f parties' commitment to their electoral platforms. R ; in particular, q ; is consistent with the equilibrium condition. As in the previous case, it is veri ed that there exists at least some separating equilibria as characterized above. 12 Note that we require the inequalities in iii and iv to hold strictly. Some slack between the LHS and the RHS of the inequalities is required in order to satisfy the rst equilibrium condition, as it is clear from Appendix 2. The same holds true with respect to Conditions iii' and iv'. payo is smaller than ,1. Finally, if a pooling equilibrium satis es either i or ii of Section 3, the expected payo is ,1; while if it satis es iii, the expected payo is ,1 , where is positive. Thus, if one of the best equilibria is played, policy reversals are necessarily observed. We can consider separating equilibria with positive correlation to be focal" to the extent that they are the best for voters.
Credibility of commitment
In separating equilibria, the information shared by the parties about the state of nature serves as a signal leading to correlated play b y the parties. However, a subclass of separating equilibria exhibit the seemingly unnatural feature of a negative correlation between policy platforms and the state of nature. Note that negative correlation equilibria require the left-wing party, if it wins, to pursue a policy platform that is to the right of the state of the world. The opposite happens if the right-wing party wins. Hence, both the winning party and the median voter could be made better o if the party in o ce were allowed to renegotiate its policy platform. Our commitment assumption becomes suspect in these equilibria because it does not seem reasonable to assume that voters would punish a party for a move that would bene t them. This leads one to think that a sensible requirement to ask of an equilibrium is that commitment should becredible in the sense that in case of winning a party would not modify its policy platform even if the median voter were willing to go along with such a decision.
In particular, we will say that an equilibrium x , In words, we say that an equilibrium is credible if, after the election is over and regardless of the result of the election, there is no policy platform di erent from the one prescribed by the equilibrium that makes both the winning party and the median voter better o . In separating equilibria, the credibility requirement boils down to 
A larger numberof states
A question arises as to whether it is reasonable to assume that the number of signal values is two, and as to how robust our results are if the numberis more than two. First, we think that a model with two possible signal values is a good representation of the situations in which parties and especially voters can only get a rough idea of the direction in which policy should be moving, for instance, low state intervention in the economy v ersus pervasive intervention Harrington 1993 makes a similar point. Second, it can be shown that for any nite number of states a pure strategy completely separating equilibrium with positive correlation should exhibit policy reversals in the sense that the left-wing resp. right-wing party should win the election with probability one when the state of the world is the most favorable for the adoption of right-leaning resp. left-leaning policies, and that the left-wing resp. right-wing party implements the policy which is the farthest right resp. left among all the implemented policies in the equilibrium. The intuition for this result is the same as the one that underlies Proposition 2: when the most extreme signal to the right is observed, the left-wing party will move to the right far enough to win the election with probability one because there is no way in which out-of-equilibrium beliefs can penalize" it for doing so.
Downsian parties
Note that our payo speci cation for the parties downplays the traditional Downsian motivation for getting elected: holding o ce per se. If parties were primarily o ce-motivated in this sense, there would be some pooling equilibria with full convergence in which both parties would have a positive probability of winning the election as long as both played according to the equilibrium strategy.
Separating equilibria with full convergence in either or both states, however, would remain impossible: they would imply either x , L = x , R = ,1 or It is easy to verify that other incentives for deviations can be eliminated by appropriately choosing the belief system . For instance, we can specify x; x , R = 1 for x x , R so that it never pays for the left party to deviate to the right of x , R , regardless of its love for o ce. Therefore, the above condition turns out to be a necessary and su cient condition for the existence of separating equilibria with policy reversals when parties are o ce-motivated as well as policy-motivated.
Conclusion
We present a spatial model of electoral competition with asymmetric information between parties and voters. We describe the complete set of equilibria in which parties follow pure strategies, and show that, when parties get to observe one of two possible signals, one favoring the adoption of left-leaning policies and the other favoring the adoption of right-leaning policies, all separating equilibria exhibit policy reversals. That is, the policies implemented by the left-wing party when it wins the election are located to the right o f t h e policies implemented by the right-wing party. Reversals are observed only across elections: in each election, the platform proposed by the left party is located to the left of that proposed by the right party. The model shows, then, that policy reversals are possible whenever: i there is uncertainty among voters about which is the best policy course, and adopting the best policy course may i n volve a substantial policy shift, ii political parties share some relevant information that voters lack, which m a y serve as a correlating device for their policy platforms, and iii parties are policy-oriented and have polarized ideological preferences.
Formally, the model we develop is a multi-sender signaling game. Ap-plications of such games are still relatively sparse. Our paper illustrates that they might b e useful to analyze electoral competition, with potentially surprising results.
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Appendix 1
This appendix establishes that the pooling equilibria described by Proposition 1 satisfy the rst equilibrium condition perfection. We consider explicitly case i, with x L + x R 0 see Figure 1 . All other cases are analogous.
According to the speci ed beliefs, if both parties propose their equilibrium actions, voters believe that the two states are equally likely and vote for Party R. If only Party L deviates, voters will believe that the state of the world is 1. Hence, To save on notation, we let q.,.=1 2 if the voters are indi erent between the two parties and the equilibrium does not require them to randomize in a particular way. To check for perfection, consider Finally, when both parties deviate, voters believe that the two states are equally likely. Hence, we can take q k x 0 L ; x 0 R = qx 0 L ; x 0 R = 1 =2.
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Appendix 2
This appendix establishes that the separating equilibria described by Propositions 2 and 3 satisfy the rst equilibrium condition. We consider explicitly a separating equilibrium with positive correlation as described by Proposition 2 see Figure 2 . The proof for a separating equilibrium with negative correlation is analogous.
For the sake of brevity, we restrict our attention to the case in which Party L deviates at s = 1 . Other cases are taken care of in a similar manner. 33
